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A B S T R A C T
Background: Cryptomarkets represent an important drug market innovation by bringing buyers and
sellers of illegal drugs together in a ‘hidden’ yet public online marketplace. We ask: How do cryptomarket
drug sellers and buyers perceive the risks of detection and arrest, and attempt to limit them?
Methods: We analyse selected texts produced by vendors operating on the ﬁrst major drug cryptomarket,
Silk Road (N = 600) alongside data extracted from the marketplace discussion forum that include buyer
perspectives. We apply Fader’s (2016) framework for understanding how drug dealers operating ‘ofﬂine’
attempt to reduce the risk of detection and arrest: visibility reduction, charge reduction and risk
distribution.
Results: We characterize drug transactions on cryptomarkets as ‘stretched’ across time, virtual and
physical space, and handlers, changing the location and nature of risks faced by cryptomarket users. The
key locations of risk of detection and arrest by law enforcement were found in ‘ofﬂine’ activities of
cryptomarket vendors (packaging and delivery drop-offs) and buyers (receiving deliveries). Strategies in
response involved either creating or disrupting routine activities in line with a non-offending identity.
Use of encrypted communication was seen as ‘good practice’ but often not employed. ‘Drop shipping’
allowed some Silk Road vendors to sell illegal drugs without the necessity of handling them.
Conclusion: Silk Road participants neither viewed themselves as immune to, nor passively accepting of,
the risk of detection and arrest. Rational choice theorists have viewed offending decisions as constrained
by limited access to relevant information. Cryptomarkets as ‘illicit capital’ sharing communities provide
expanded and low-cost access to information enabling drug market participants to make more accurate
assessments of the risk of apprehension. The abundance of drug market intelligence available to those on
both sides of the law may function to speed up innovation in illegal drug markets, as well as necessitate
and facilitate the development of law enforcement responses.
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As drug dealers draw the attention of potential customers they
risk simultaneously drawing law enforcement attention (Reuter &
Caulkins, 2004). As Frith and McElwee (2007, p. 281) put it, “the
need not to be known as a drug-dealer [is] offset by the more
pressing need [ . . . ] to be known as a drug-dealer.” Drug
cryptomarkets address this paradox by bringing together buyers
and sellers of illegal drugs in an online ‘hidden’ and global
marketplace (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014). Cryptomarkets have
been deﬁned as: marketplaces that host multiple sellers or
‘vendors’; that provide participants with anonymity via their* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: judith.aldridge@manchester.ac.uk (J. Aldridge).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.10.010
0955-3959/Crown Copyright © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access arti
4.0/).location on the hidden web and use of cryptocurrencies for
payment; and that aggregate and display customer feedback
ratings and comments (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016). The world’s
attention was brought to the ﬁrst major drug cryptomarket, Silk
Road, in June 2011, after a post in the blog Gawker (Chen, 2011).
Drug scholars have described initial incredulity at the discovery
(e.g. Barratt & Aldridge, 2016). With illegal drug sales carrying the
risk of detection and arrest, how can they be bought and sold so
openly?
In traditional ‘ofﬂine’ drug markets, a range of strategies used
by drug sellers function to minimize the risk of detection and arrest
by law enforcement (e.g. Fader, 2016; Jacobs, 1996; Jacobs & Miller,
1998; Jacques & Reynald, 2012; Jacques & Wright, 2011), allowing
drug markets to ﬂourish in spite of prohibition. However, the
particular risk conﬁguration for cryptomarket drug buying and
selling will differ to ofﬂine drug markets, as will risk-minimizationcle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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sellers and buyers locate law enforcement risk, and how do they
seek to reduce the risk of detection when effectively operating in
plain sight of law enforcement? Researchers contributing to the
growing literature on drug cryptomarkets have answered by
pointing to anonymity mechanisms on these marketplaces (e.g.
Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014; Tzanetakis, Kamphausen, Werse, &
von Laufenberg, 2015; Van Hout & Bingham, 2013). Their location
on the hidden, so-called ‘dark’ web is accessed using software like
Tor, designed to enable internet users to maintain privacy and
anonymity (Lewman, 2016). Coupled with the use of non-identity
carrying cryptocurrencies like bitcoin for payment, these anonym-
ity mechanisms function to allow illegal sales to occur openly, yet
remain hard-to-reach by law enforcement (Cox, 2016b). But are
these anonymity mechanisms enough?
We begin by reviewing the fast-growing literature on drug
cryptomarkets using Fader’s (2016) framework for conceptualizing
drug seller risk reduction strategies in traditional ‘ofﬂine’ drug
markets—visibility reduction, charge reduction, and risk distribu-
tion. Rational choice perspectives have been deployed effectively
in understanding drug market participation, for example revealing
drug dealers’ attempts to reduce the risk of apprehension and
arrest by law enforcement (Jacques & Reynald, 2012). Many
rational choice perspectives acknowledge that the cost-beneﬁt
assessments involved in decisions to offend are ‘constrained’ (e.g.
Akers, 1990; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Accessing all relevant
information to enable offending decisions that minimize costs
(e.g. arrest) and maximize beneﬁts (e.g. proﬁt) may itself be an
impractical and costly undertaking, with cost-beneﬁt assessments
thereby constrained by access to limited information (Jacobs &
Wright, 2010). We consider the possibility that drug cryptomarkets
function as communities that enable information sharing for
reducing the risks posed by law enforcement to illegal drug
trading. Might online settings for criminal activity function to
expand otherwise constrained rational choice?
Visibility reduction
Fader (2016) identiﬁes strategies used by drug dealers
operating in traditional ofﬂine markets to reduce the visibility
to law enforcement of the routine activities of drug sales. Through
environmental positioning, for example, drug dealers in open
markets may select locations allowing them to discern the
presence of police and pre-emptively relocate their operations
(Jacobs, 1996) or employ ‘lookouts’ (Johnson & Natarajan, 1995).
Piza and Sytsma (2016) identiﬁed faster exchanges where drug
transactions took place in commercial compared to residential
locations, and during daylight hours, suggesting that drug sellers
attuned to the increased likelihood of onlookers modify their
transaction activity accordingly. An important way in which drug
dealers have reduced their visibility in recent decades is connected
to readily available and inexpensive mobile phones (VanNostrand
& Tewksbury, 1999), allowing buyers to contact dealers to arrange
transactions in less visible private locations (e.g. Fader, 2016; St.
Jean, 2008). In this way, many drug markets have evolved from
‘open’ into ‘closed’, with dealers transacting only with known
customers, acquiring new customers through trusted introduc-
tions (May & Hough, 2004).
Drug cryptomarkets reverse this development. Cryptomarket
vendors conduct business in plain sight of law enforcement, or
indeed anyone with a computer, anonymizing software such as
Tor, and the cryptomarket’s URL. Yet cryptomarkets enable buyers
and sellers to transact with a considerable degree of anonymity
by virtue of their location on the hidden web, making it difﬁcult
for law enforcement to trace marketplace activity to participants
(Lewman, 2016). Cryptocurrencies, like bitcoin, are notcompletely anonymous, but their use obfuscates links between
payments and individuals, particularly when combined with
recent developments like bitcoin tumblers that further obscure
payment trails (Cox, 2016b). By allowing vendors to do business
with unknown customers located across the globe, cryptomarkets
can be understood as ‘anonymous open’ drug markets (see
Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016b) in contrast to the ‘closed’ drug
markets that reduce the risk of detection for many ofﬂine retail
drug dealers.
A second way that cryptomarket vendors seek to reduce the
visibility of their routine business activities is connected to their
reliance on postal services and delivery companies. Vendors
employ often ingenious so-called ‘stealth’ strategies to disguise
drug shipments so as not to raise the suspicion of post ofﬁce,
delivery and customs ofﬁcials (e.g. Martin, 2014; Ormsby, 2014;
Tzanetakis et al., 2015; van Hout & Bingham, 2014). Given the
potential risk of arrest after parcel interception, particularly where
large or international shipments are concerned (Décary-Hétu,
Paquet-Clouston, & Aldridge, 2016), it is no surprise that
assessment of the quality of vendors’ stealth packaging features
so heavily in the customer feedback that generates vendor
marketplace reputation metrics (Cox, 2016a).
Charge reduction
Fader (2016) documents the strategies used by drug dealers
operating in ofﬂine markets calculated to reduce the severity of
legal penalties in the event of arrest. A number of these strategies
can usefully be compared to the cryptomarket context.
Brokers arrange deals between buyers and sellers with little or
no handling of the drugs themselves, thereby reducing the risk of
being apprehended in possession of contraband. Brokering can
occur in retail drug markets (e.g. Fader, 2016) but appears more
commonly among upper level drug market suppliers (e.g. Adler,
1993; Pearson & Hobbs, 2003). Taylor (2015) suggests that the
globalizing inﬂuence of open or ‘surface’ web internet drug sales
makes ‘drop shipping’ possible, whereby retailers operating in a
jurisdiction where a substance is illegal arrange purchases on
behalf of their customers from manufacturers or wholesalers
instructed to deliver directly to their customers. A recent Interpol
report (2015) concluded that there is currently insufﬁcient
evidence of the practice on drug cryptomarkets, as has been
documented, for example, with illicit online pharmacies on the
clear web (e.g. McCoy et al., 2012). Soska and Christin (2015),
referring speciﬁcally to the cryptomarket context, suggest a
possible vendor strategy of arbitrage across marketplaces that
might include such arrangements, but research has yet to ascertain
whether drop shipping is used on cryptomarkets.
A second charge reduction strategy employed by ofﬂine drug
dealers involves carrying only small quantities of drugs at any one
time. Evidence that cryptomarket vendors elect to make small
shipments to reduce the risk of interception and tracing to vendors
or intended recipients has been documented by Décary-Hétu et al.
(2016), who found that one of the factors that predicted vendor
willingness to risk shipping drugs across international borders was
lower weight deals.
Selling only to known customers to avoid the possibility of
transacting with undercover police is a further charge reduction
strategy documented by Fader (2016). Results from a nationally
representative US survey suggest that the majority of those
approached by drug dealers are drug users, with only 3–4% of non-
users approached in this way (Storr, Chen, & Anthony, 2004). More
risky direct approaches to unknown potential customers may be
more typical in contexts like raves and dance events (e.g. Coomber,
2003); dealers here may rely on knowledge of the setting to avoid
selling to undercover police.
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context of drug cryptomarkets are obvious. Law enforcement has
taken advantage of the anonymity afforded to cryptomarket
participants in successful efforts that closed a number of market-
places in November 2014 with the aptly code-named Operation
Onymous, which – alongside other operations resulting in arrests
of cryptomarket participants documented by van Slobbe (2016) –
involve this type of marketplace inﬁltration. Certainly vendors can
be discerning in choosing customers. Just as potential customers
can assess vendor reputation metrics to inform their selection of
‘trustworthy’ vendors, vendors, in turn, are privy to the transaction
history of buyers and can refuse those new to the marketplace or
with disputes associated to prior transactions (Tzanetakis et al.,
2015), but this strategy may have limited utility for avoiding
undercover law enforcement. Researchers have yet to identify
whether and how cryptomarket vendors attempt to avoid trans-
acting with undercover law enforcement.
The ﬁnal charge reduction strategy used in ofﬂine drug markets
discussed by Fader involves dealers avoiding ties to evidence that
may result in successful prosecution. She notes the use of stash
houses in her own (2016) and other studies (e.g. Jacobs, 1996;
Jacobs & Miller, 1998; Natarajan, Clarke, & Johnson, 1995; St. Jean,
2008). Reliance on cash payment or commodity exchanges (see
VanNostrand & Tewksbury, 1999) may also function to reduce law
enforcement efforts to link payments to particular buyers and
sellers. Salinas-Edwards (2013) in his ethnography of retail and
wholesale drug dealers documented their innovative strategies
when keeping ‘tick lists’ – records of debt owed by customers –
designed to limit the evidential links between themselves and
their debtors, for example disguising these as household shopping
lists, left in plain sight attached to a refrigerator with a magnet,
consistent with the pretense.
Cryptomarket users limit ties to the extensive and publicly
available evidence of their illegal transactions through marketplace
anonymity mechanisms already discussed that function to make the
identiﬁcation of individuals behind aliases more difﬁcult (Cox,
2016b). The ‘digital traces’ left by cryptomarket transactions (see
Décary-Hétu & Aldridge, 2015) provide law enforcement – and
researchers – with unprecedented data on drug supply not available
for ofﬂine markets. However, once a vendor’s actual identity is
connected to a marketplace alias through law enforcement efforts,
the vendor’s entire transaction history is made available as evidence
to effect arrest and prosecution. It is possible that holding separate
and multiple vendor accounts across marketplaces have the effect of
reducing risk in the event that these online identities cannot be
linked. This possibility is suggested by the observation of Soska and
Christin (2015) that the practice of vendors holding multiple
accounts increased after the proliferation of cryptomarkets follow-
ing Silk Road’s closure by the FBI in 2013.
Risk distribution
Drug dealers operating in ofﬂine markets may attempt to
reduce their risk by spreading it. Some dealers in Fader’s research
(2016) worked in teams, or paid employees for particular tasks
like delivery or the use of houses for stashing drugs or cash. Piza
and Sytsma (2016) observed that dealers more commonly
employed carriers or runners when operating in commercial
than residential settings, suggesting that the presence of
onlookers may lead dealers to divide elements of the transaction
among partners.
A number of cryptomarket features may be understood to
distribute risk. Cryptomarket vendors do not deliver drugs in
person, instead effectively contracting-out this risky component of
the transaction to delivery services. Postal deliveries carry their
own risks, however, where intercepted packages are traced tosenders or intended recipients (Décary-Hétu et al., 2016). The
practice of holding multiple vendor accounts (Soska & Christin,
2015), discussed above in relation to charge reduction, may also
distribute risk. Vendors may operate in teams, dividing the labour
involved in their enterprises, although this has yet to be
documented in the cryptomarket literature.
Research aims
The literature reviewed above reveals that the particular
conﬁguration of law enforcement-related risks that cryptomarket
sellers and buyers face differs in key respects from those connected
to ofﬂine drug markets. Our understanding of precisely how
cryptomarket participants perceive and manage these risks,
however, is limited. To address this gap in our understanding,
we analyse two sources of data. Postings in discussion forums
connected to cryptomarkets have been characterized by Martin as
a “shared repository of knowledge regarding effective concealment
and counter-interdiction techniques” (2014 p. 69). We analyse
postings on the discussion forum associated with the ﬁrst major
drug cryptomarket, Silk Road, a methodology successfully
deployed by Holt, Smirnova, Chua, and Copes (2015) in connection
to online sales of stolen identity data.
Second, we analyse the typically lengthy vendor-generated text
found in drugs listed for sale on Silk Road. When listing an item for
sale, vendors complete a form to provide relevant information,
including the speciﬁc drug and quantity being sold (e.g. ‘1/4 ounce
purple kush’), the price and postage costs. In addition – and just
like on legal marketplaces like eBay and Amazon – vendors are
given considerable additional scope for description. These texts
provide us with a valuable opportunity to understand how vendors
convey to their customers the legal risks they perceive, and their
customer-focused strategies for minimizing them.
The decision to base our analyses on data generated in
connection to the ﬁrst major drug cryptomarket, Silk Road, rather
than on marketplaces that have proliferated since, is intentional.
Our data were collected only weeks before Silk Road was shut
down by the FBI in October 2013, and over a year before Operation
Onymous that shut down a number of cryptomarkets in November
2014 (Aﬁlipoaie & Shortis, 2015). Décary-Hétu et al. (2016) suggest
that Silk Road users, whose drug transactions therefore occurred
prior to these operations and resulting arrests (see Branwen, 2015),
may have viewed themselves as relatively immune from law
enforcement. But was this actually the case? We aim to answer two
related research questions. Did Silk Road participants believe
themselves to be immune from the risk of apprehension and
arrest? And to the extent that they acknowledged these risks, how
did they seek to reduce them?
Methods
Data from Silk Road were scraped in September 2013 using a
methodology described in detail elsewhere (Aldridge & Décary-
Hétu, 2014, 2016b; Décary-Hétu et al., 2016). This process
generated nearly 11,000 listings placed by vendors for the sale
of drugs.
Table 1 details sample selection for analyses. Listings for a range
of drugs popular on Silk Road were chosen: benzodiazepines,
cocaine powder, ecstasy pills, herbal cannabis, amphetamines and
tryptamines. Where vendors held multiple listings for a drug in
different price/quantity amounts, one was selected randomly.
100 listings were then randomly selected for each drug to generate
the sample of 600 for quantitative analysis. 50 listings for each
drug were selected (n = 277) for qualitative analyses (the shortfall
results from the fact that there were only 27 listings for DMT, the
drug selected from the tryptamine sub-sample).
Table 2
Vendors making listing reference to service features relevant to characterizing and
minimizing legal risk (n, %).
N = 600 n %
Risks connected to shipping 335 55%
Shipping methods 283 47%
Product packaging, including ‘stealth’ measures 198 33%
Refund/reship policies 106 18%
Risks connected to data security 191 32%
Data and transaction security measures taken 191 32%












Benzodiazepinesa 701 103 100 50
Cocaine powder 397 106 100 50
Ecstasy pills 444 102 100 50
Herbal cannabis 1219 239 100 50
Amphetamines 385 106 100 50c
Tryptaminesb 463 106 100 27c
Total 3609 762 600 277
a Name-branded benzodiazepines were included: Xanax, Valium, Clonazepam, Lorazepam and Bromazepam.
b Including: DMT, 5-meo-dalt, 5-meo-DMT, ayahuasca, changa, mushrooms.
c Methamphetamine and DMT listings were retained for qualitative analyses in these two listing categories.
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to Silk Road’s archived discussion forum. Because forum participants
also included buyers, these data capture buyer perspectives. After
extensivereadinginthreerelevantsub-forums (‘Legal’, ‘Security’ and
‘Shipping’) we inductively generated relevant terms used in various
combinations to search the entire discussion forum that ran for the
life of Silk Road. These included appropriate variations on: arrest,
controlled deliveries, drop shipping, drop-offs, encryption, ﬁngerprints,
law enforcement, mailbox, odours, packaging, post ofﬁce, post/
mailman, security, signature, stealth, tracked, undercover.
Themes were identiﬁed in both data sources deductively in
connection to visibility reduction, charge reduction and risk
distribution. Qualitative analysis proceeded inductively to gener-
ate emerging theory. Consistent with discourse analytic
approaches (Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001) that have been
deployed effectively in drug research (e.g. Askew, 2016; Riley,
Morey, & Grifﬁn, 2008), we do not treat the texts produced by
cryptomarket participants as simple reﬂections of behaviour, but
as accounts produced for a particular purpose (e.g. to generate
sales), and also therefore consider competing interpretations of
these accounts. Following guidelines found in the emergingliter-
atureon ethical conduct in research enabled though the capture – via
web ‘scraping’ – of the ‘digital traces’ left by online illicit activity
(Décary-Hétu & Aldridge, 2015), we paraphrase quotations so that
users’ online identities cannot be ascertained through searching
(Bancroft & Reid, 2015; Décary-Hétu & Aldridge, 2015).
Results
Visibility reduction
While cryptomarket vendors might be thought to reduce their
risk of detection and arrest by contracting out the face-to-face
hand-over component of transactions to postal delivery services, it
was risks in connection to shipping and delivery that most
concerned buyers and sellers. Over half of listings (55%) detailed
delivery practices (see Table 2) connected to reducing the visibility
of this aspect of cryptomarket drug trading at the ‘ofﬂine’ customer
end of a transaction. Some vendors instructed customers to
provide real, rather than fake, names when placing orders to
reduce the chances of shipment interception:
Your postman knows your name. Please give me your real name
– the same name all your mail goes to. Using fake names can
alert the authorities, meaning your shipment may not arrive,
and may actually get seized. Neither of us wants that to
happen.” (Weed V343)
Buyers shared advice on the discussion forum aimed at raising
the visibility of ‘legitimate’ routine deliveries to avoid raising the
suspicion of local delivery workers:I like to order a lot of stuff online so my mailman doesn’t suspect
the illegal stuff. Always keep to your usual routine too. If you
usually go for a run when the mailman comes, okay. But if you
suddenly start not being home for deliveries, that’s suspicious.
(Forum posting)
Buyers were aware that ‘controlled deliveries’ by undercover
law enforcement of packages identiﬁed as suspect could lead to
arrest when receiving deliveries. Although ‘tracked’ shipping was a
service provided by some vendors, buyers were often advised to
avoid shipping services that may require signatures, and not to
accept packages requiring an unanticipated signature, instead
simply accepting the loss. This post explained how buyers could
discern that a controlled delivery might be imminent:
My research leads me to think that you can avoid CDs by
becoming aware of unusual activity in your area. I’m ultra-
cautious. I know exactly when my mailman arrives, I know what
he looks like, and I’m friendly with him. I know where the mail
trucks are and what time they unload. I watch everything
carefully in my neighborhood. Look out for anything out of the
ordinary happening before you expect your delivery. Is
someone you don’t know parked nearby in a car on a really
hot day? That might be a clue that a CD is coming your way.
(Forum posting)
This vendor warned international customers that package
tracking could be highly risky for illegal drugs:
For my US and Australian customers: If you want your shipment
tracked, you may have to sign for it. Where drugs are concerned,
your countries are almost comically strict. Sometimes it is
better to take the loss than the jail time. (Ecstasy V205)
While shipping was the most common risk that vendors
identiﬁed in their listings (55%), this means that nearly as many did
not highlight these risks, perhaps reﬂecting the tension this vendor
displays between acknowledging risk and gaining customer trust.
Vendors were aware of the risk of detection connected to their
ofﬂine activities when making deliveries. They shared strategies
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activities involved in making shipment drop-offs to postal
services:
Rotate your mailbox drops randomly in case LE [law enforce-
ment] are watching particular boxes. If undercover LE makes an
order it can be traced to a box. All they have to do is ﬁnd TOR
users in the vicinity, so avoid using mailboxes near you. (Forum
posting)
When one forum poster suggested drop-offs at post ofﬁces in
different cities, this response was typical of the many who pointed
to the risk of entering post ofﬁces at all:
Well done. You’ve now been ﬁlmed on CCTV mailing packages
with illegal contents. NEVER go into a post ofﬁce or hand to a
postal employee. (Forum posting)
Forum discussion included advice for avoiding post ofﬁce drop
offs, even with international shipping:
The trick when shipping internationally from the USA is making
packages appear to be business documents so that you are not
required to ﬁll in a customs declaration, and ship the usual
(anonymous!) way using a mailbox. Find out the weight that
counts for ‘documents with no value’ so you can afﬁx the right
postage yourself. (Forum posting)
It was not just in connection to the ofﬂine work of making
deliveries that vendors located and sought to reduce the risk of
detection by reducing their visibility:
You can feel friendship and camaraderie here on the vendor
forum, I get that. But some on here share details of their
personal lives. It’s not enough to hide your name if you reveal
other things that might just make you more identiﬁable in the
end. Do you really need to say what kind of job you do? Where
you went to college? What you’ve been arrested for? What your
ﬁrst language is? This all might seem to you like trivial detail
with no context. But it all can add up. With enough clues,
anyone can narrow it down and make a correct guess, including
law enforcement. (Forum posting)
An alternative strategy for reducing visibility is suggested by
this vendor: vetting potential customers who may risk drawing
mainstream attention to the marketplace itself:
Google your customers, get a feel for who they are. Do they have
political beliefs about this place? Do they have 1000s of
facebook friends so they can spread the word? We don’t want or
need this kind of exposure. (Forum posting)
This tension between publicity and obscurity has also been
noted by Maddox, Barratt, Allen, and Lenton (2015) in connection
to their ‘digital ethnography’ of Silk Road.
Packaging technique designed to reduce the risk of interception
was a popular topic for discussion. ‘Stealth’ packaging aimed to
disguise suspect contents, and functioned to reduce the visibility of
cryptomarket vendor activities. Small package size was often
recommended, particularly for international shipments:
Anything that will not ﬁt in a plain letter envelope is much more
likely to not make it through customs. (Forum posting)
If you ship a parcel that weighs over 13oz, you need to go to a
post ofﬁce, be recorded on camera, and ﬁll in a customs form.
Make it ﬁt in a bubble envelope and avoid all this. (Forum
posting)
One forum poster published a link to an FBI publication
(Vajgert, 1996) detailing criteria used by the US postal service for
identifying suspect packages then selected for further inspection:
heavily taped on seams, packages emitting odours, hand-written
address labels, misspelled names or addresses, ﬁctitious returnaddresses, or names with no known connection to the destination
address.
Strategies used to reduce the odours emanating from packages
that could trigger parcel interception were shared. This poster
pointed to the possibility that a suggested ‘stealth’ technique
designed to reduce odour might make contents more visible:
If you seal with two or more bags and vacuum seal the
innermost bag, this compresses the bud. But it’s a trade off
because then it’s easier to ‘feel’. To be honest, I’m not sure
what’s better here – a vapor-tight product or a thinner package.
If you decide that smell is the worst risk, be careful how you
handle the ﬁrst layer. Removing all odour requires moving it to a
staging area and swabbing carefully with alcohol before second
bagging. Without doing this, molecules on the ﬁrst bag can be
transferred to the second. (Forum posting)
Doing stealth ‘well’ may have been difﬁcult and time
consuming. Considerable discussion was devoted to the perceived
inadequacies of stealth techniques used by vendors:
Some vendors on here seem to believe that vacuum sealed
powder hidden between a few sheets of paper is enough. I’ve
done my research. After only 15 minutes the bag is vapor
permeable and can be detected by sniffer dogs. This might be
okay for domestic shipments, but not international, and the
international market is way more proﬁtable, especially for some
substances and countries. Vendors have to up their game. That’s
what law enforcement is doing. (Forum posting)
Charge reduction
We found evidence of ‘drop shipping’ methods common in legal
e-commerce on Silk Road. Drop shipping allows vendors to trade
without ever possessing illegal substances themselves, by placing
orders with other sellers (on the marketplace or elsewhere) on
behalf of their customers to whom these other sellers ship directly.
One vendor provided a lengthy and in-depth guide to drop
shipping as a tool for importing from China. Other vendors used
the forum to promote this service:
I am now offering worldwide sales and drop shipping. This is
ideal for agents. I’m offering discounts for agents selling big
volume. Note: there will be additional shipping charges when I
ship to other countries. Get in touch to discuss. (Forum posting)
I have new shipping options. I can ship direct from China to your
drop shipping address. Or I can re-ship from China to one of my
drop shipping addresses, and then re-ship to you. (Forum
posting)
This buyer asked about other buyer experiences with a known
drop shipper: “Anyone had any of [Vendor name]’s mephedrone
drop shipped from China? Any problems with customs, receiving
shipments?” with replies indicating general praise for the drop
shipping vendor. However, this practice may have been viewed as
problematic by some customers:
He ﬁnally PM-ed me saying he waits until he gets enough orders
so he can order the product cheap, and then he has it drop
shipped. I would NEVER have ordered from him to begin with if
I’d known this was his operation. (Forum posting)
Although no undercover operations had been effected against
cryptomarkets at the time of our data collection, cryptomarket
users were undoubtedly aware of the possibility. We observed
differing opinion about the threat of undercover law enforcement.
Some appeared unconcerned, particularly in connection to small
quantity transactions, deemed of little interest to law enforcement.
Others were less sanguine:
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informants. Do not let your guard down. Trust no one. (Forum
posting)
But how? While cryptomarket users acknowledged that it was
not possible to avoid transacting with undercover law enforce-
ment, they shared strategies to protect themselves when this
happened. The key recommendation was the use of encrypted
communication, typically via ‘PGP’ (Pretty Good Privacy), an
encryption protocol allowing message encryption that only the
recipient can decrypt (Zimmermann, 1995).
Break your connection to incriminating evidence. Never use
bank transfers. Don’t use an email that can be traced back to you
for anything here, including the forums. Don’t do business with
vendors unless they use PGP. (Forum posting)
This ‘good practice’ was not always followed. Only 21% of the
vendor listings in our sample of 600 provided PGP keys or
requested that their customers use other encrypted communica-
tion methods, like Privnote (see Table 2). Even among vendors
advising customers to use encrypted communications, we
encountered indifference:
You don’t have to encrypt your address, but you probably
should. If you prefer, use Privnote instead of PGP. But up to you.
(Meth V13)
I encourage you to encrypt your address info but I don’t insist on
it. SR already encrypts messages. (Ecstasy V263)
USE PGP!! (but not required). (Weed V386)
Only 32% of vendor listings (see Table 2) referred to data
security methods, which in addition to encrypted communication,
included letting customers know how their data would be stored
and deleted:
All your details will be kept private and names and addresses
are deleted immediately after dispatch. (Ecstasy V11).
Security/privacy: I work alone. I save no data locally. I destroy
everything as soon as it’s feasible. (Cocaine V14)
Vendors were commonly advised to use gloves during
preparation and delivery of shipments to reduce evidential ties
to their activities. But as with much ‘good practice’, this was not
always considered practical, and could even be thought suspicious:
They often rip. I ﬁnd them uncomfortable and hot. And wearing
them is certainly not discreet when you’re making drop-offs.
Bandaids, latex liquid or latex tape might be good alternatives.
(Forum posting)
Charge reduction strategies, while undoubtedly viewed as
sensible precautions by Silk Road vendors, seem likely to have been
viewed by many as additional – and perhaps unnecessary – hassle,
with adoption likely not uniform.
Risk distribution
As ofﬂine drug dealers may work in teams to spread the risk of
detection, so too may cryptomarket vendors. We could not
ascertain how many vendors worked in teams, but one clue was
found in the wording of their listings. Of the 600 vendor listings,
182 (30%) referred to operations using the words ‘team’, ‘we’ and
‘our’ to describe their operations:
Don’t hesitate to message us:) If you’re not completely satisﬁed,
please contact us before leaving negative feedback and we'll try
to ﬁx the problem. (DMT V2)
Ask us any questions you like before ordering, and we’ll answer
as fast as we can! Benny’s Team. (Cocaine V45)Alternatively, wording like this may be deployed by vendors
working alone to convey the impression of operations sufﬁciently
successful to require additional staff.
This vendor provided customers with advice to reduce – via
redistribution – the risk of detection:
For those of you who are very security conscious, this is a tip
that guarantees delivery: send someone else to pick up your
package, so you don’t have to worry about being seen on camera
or showing ID. (Benzo V180).
Drop shipping, as discussed above in connection to charge
reduction strategies for reducing risk, may also be seen as a risk
distribution method.
Discussion
‘Stretched’ transactions across time, place and handlers
In ofﬂine retail drug markets, the time period over which a drug
transaction occurs may be relatively short, often involving
immediate exchange of drugs and money (Piza & Sytsma, 2016).
By contrast, as our analysis shows, transactions on drug
cryptomarkets are ‘stretched’ across time, virtual and geographical
space, and handlers. An order placed in the virtual location of the
cryptomarket by a customer is not received in its geographical
destination until packaged and shipped by the vendor, and then
delivered days, even weeks, later. The payment period is similarly
stretched: customer payments are held in ‘escrow’ by the
marketplace operating as a ‘third party’ until the shipment is
received. And, in contrast to ofﬂine retail drug markets, shipment
through postal systems requires handlers not knowingly involved
in the illegal transaction: post ofﬁce employees, and customs
ofﬁcials where these shipments cross international borders.
Drug transactions stretched across time, handlers, and physical
and virtual space, make the location and character of the law
enforcement-related risks faced by cryptomarket users often
different to those documented in ofﬂine drug markets. In ofﬂine
markets, drug dealers develop relationships of trust face-to-face
with customers (e.g. Zaitch, 2005), and pay considerable attention
to geographical locations to reduce their visibility to law
enforcement (e.g. Jacobs, 1996). Researchers referring to drug
sales on cryptomarkets have been quick to point to the contrast:
drug transactions occur in plain sight of law enforcement, with
cryptomarket anonymizing features protecting participants from
being identiﬁed. But as our analysis establishes, the ‘hidden’
encrypted location of these markets is insufﬁcient: cryptomarket
users identiﬁed and sought to reduce the risk of detection by law
enforcement connected to these stretched transactions, and did so
even before the ﬁrst successful law enforcement arrests connected
to the cryptomarket drug trade.
The ofﬂine activities involved in virtual drug buying and selling
Cryptomarkets can be understood as ‘anchored’ in ofﬂine drug
markets (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016b). While some vendors
may source their supply only on cryptomarkets themselves, many
will make stock-sourcing purchases ofﬂine from wholesalers in the
same way drug dealers selling face-to-face do. And even though
vendors transact in the virtual location of the cryptomarket,
additional ‘ofﬂine’ activities involve them in packaging up ship-
ments and dropping these into postal networks. To this end,
vendors engaged in various risk reduction strategies: they selected
delivery drop-off locations at a distance from home or work; they
reduced the visibility of their routine activities by rotating drop-off
points; and many avoided entering post ofﬁces where they might
be recorded by CCTV.
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the illegality involved – post ofﬁce employees and customs ofﬁcials
at international borders – vendors used strategies aimed at
reducing the likelihood that parcels might be intercepted and
traced to buyers or sellers. They acknowledged the advantages of
shipping drugs in sufﬁciently small quantities to appear as
ordinary business letters, and shared advice including published
criteria used by law enforcement for proﬁling suspect packages
(Vajgert, 1996). ‘Stealth’ packaging strategies were aimed not only
at reducing suspect visual cues of package contents, but also
odours that could emanate from packages, and included wearing
disposable gloves, vacuum packaging, multiple wrapping layers,
and alcohol wipes. Vendors described methods for removing their
ﬁngerprints from packages, thereby limiting evidential ties to them
in the event of parcel interception. Nevertheless, our results
suggested that use of effective stealth practices were challenging to
do well and consistently, and were sometimes discussed as
ineffectively employed by vendors.
Silk Road vendors often advised customers to supply their real
names for delivery: the use of fake names was believed to increase
the chances that parcels would be identiﬁed as suspicious by post
ofﬁce employees and ﬂagged for further investigation by authori-
ties, potentially resulting in the ‘controlled deliveries’ by under-
cover law enforcement that has been used to effect arrests
(Branwen, 2015). Vendors sometimes alerted customers request-
ing their shipments be ‘tracked’ to the possibility that law
enforcement may be able to access tracking data, alongside the
typical requirement of then having to sign for packages, a risk also
noted by Tzanetakis et al. (2015). Our analysis of data from the
vendor-generated texts in the listings they placed for sale
demonstrated that both shipping and security-related risks were
highlighted by vendors to customers, but not by a majority.
Vendors may have been reluctant to spell out these risks plainly,
preferring instead to focus on securing the trust of potential
customers by down-playing risk.
The risk reduction strategies we identiﬁed for vendors and
buyers contrasted: vendors disrupted routines involved in ofﬂine
activities to make these less visible; buyers instead sought to make
more visible their ‘ordinary’ routine activities in receiving
‘legitimate’ deliveries allowing their illicit shipments to slip under
the radar of onlookers. These contrasting strategies nevertheless
both functioned to achieve the same kind of ‘contextual assimila-
tion’ described by Jacobs and Miller in connection to traditional
ofﬂine drug markets: both create “images of themselves and their
behaviour consistent with a non-offending identity” (1998 p. 555–
6).
Our ﬁndings suggest the possibility that Silk Road vendors may
have worked in teams, a risk distribution practice also identiﬁed in
ofﬂine markets (Fader, 2016). Further research is required to
identify the particular partnership conﬁgurations cryptomarket
vendors may use to reduce the risk of detection by law
enforcement. For example, vendors may employ partners to
source ofﬂine supply, source packaging materials and package
shipments, or make drop-offs for delivery.
Interpol (2015) concluded that there is insufﬁcient evidence of
the practice of ‘drop shipping’ on drug cryptomarkets, whereby
vendors are able to sell to their customers without the necessity of
handling the drugs themselves, by placing orders from other
suppliers who then ship directly to their customers. We found
evidence of drop shipping vendors on Silk Road. This practice
reduces the risk of being found in possession of illegal substances
connected to the usual requirement of sourcing drug supply ofﬂine,
as well as holding and storing illegal drugs in their homes or
elsewhere. As cryptomarkets have proliferated since, so too may
the opportunities for proﬁtable arbitrage deployed in this way
across cryptomarkets.Virtual strategies for risk reduction
Lewman (2016) suggests that as criminal activity moves online
to marketplaces facilitated by anonymity mechanisms like Tor, so
too do law enforcement strategies to combat it, for example
cryptomarket purchases by undercover police. Our results show
that Silk Road participants were well aware of this possibility.
Advice to both buyers and sellers for protection in this connection
was to employ strict data security measures designed to reduce the
opportunity for law enforcement to link transactions to real-world
identities, for example communicating only via encrypted
messaging like PGP. Perhaps surprisingly, only 21% of vendor
listings in our sample included a PGP key or requested customers
use alternatives like Privnote for direct messaging. Some vendors
referred to the use of encrypted communication only as a
‘preference’ they acknowledged created additional hassle. Assur-
ances by vendors of their ‘good practice’ in safely deleting
customer information occurred only rarely in their listings. Soska
and Christin (2015) note a substantial increase in PGP adoption by
vendors post-Onymous, with PGP use on two marketplaces near
90%. This suggests that law enforcement responses to cryptomar-
kets result in continued security innovations, thereby making
cryptomarkets more resilient to undercover law enforcement
efforts.
‘Expanding’ versus ‘constrained’ rational choice
Rational choice theoretical approaches to understanding
decisions to engage in criminal activity consider how individuals
weigh up the relative costs (e.g. arrest) and the beneﬁts (e.g. proﬁt)
of doing so. But offenders may lack access to all relevant
information – especially the extent and nature of the risk-related
costs involved – in making their assessments. Although rational
choice perspectives may appear to cast offenders as perfectly
rational information processors, many criminologists instead
characterize offender choices as ‘constrained’: they have only
limited ‘data’ available to them for selecting courses of action that
maximize beneﬁts while reducing risks (Akers, 1990; Cornish &
Clarke, 1986). As Jacobs and Wright explain, “obtaining complete
and/or perfect information is simply too costly (in terms of time,
resources, and foregone opportunities)” (2010 p. 7141). But what if
the cryptomarket community reduces these costs, effectively
providing participants with more, and perhaps better, data to
inform their decisions? In this sense, cryptomarkets may provide
opportunities for ‘expanded’ rather than constrained rational
choice.
Our results depict cryptomarkets as communities that facilitate
the sharing of ‘illicit capital’ that drug buyers and sellers can use to
reduce the risk of apprehension and arrest. This is not to suggest
that cryptomarkets create the possibility of perfect rationality. But
by increasing access to relevant information that drug market
participants then have at their disposal when making their cost-
beneﬁt assessments, at least some of the factors that constrain
rational choices may be reduced, making online drug sellers better
able to settle on suitably risk-reducing actions. This development
may be important for criminologists to acknowledge in under-
standing a range of offending domains where individuals converge
in virtual locations for illegal activity. The innovation of Silk Road in
this connection was substantial: the marketplace functioned as a
one-stop-shop combining drug trading with intelligence sharing,
an innovation step-change compared to that identiﬁed by Holt,
Blevins, and Kuhns (2014) in their research on “johns’” use of
websites like Craigslist to warn others seeking the services of sex
workers of law enforcement activity in particular locations.
With a rational choice lens, our analysis focused only on the
‘cost’ side of the assessment drug buyers and sellers make, leading
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enable more fully-informed rational decisions than would be
possible in ofﬂine counterparts. Future research could fruitfully
focus on the other side of the rational choice equation: the beneﬁts.
Does the cryptomarket community allow drug sellers to maximize
beneﬁts, for example establishing how knowledge may be shared
to streamline business operations and increase proﬁts?
Do cryptomarket users face less risk of arrest than their ofﬂine
counterparts?
Cryptomarket drug sellers may share some risks with those
operating ofﬂine, but we identiﬁed risks unique to the
cryptomarket context. What remains to be understood is which
marketplace location carries more risk of detection for buyers
and for sellers. We appropriately treated the texts that comprised
our data as ‘discourse’, acknowledging therefore that statements
about practice could not be read as straightforward reﬂections of
associated activity. We are, therefore, unable to ascertain the
actual extent of adherence to ‘good practice’ by buyers and
sellers.
We may speculate. It may be, for example, that the likely
considerable social and technical capital of cryptomarket vendors
gives them much in common with the ‘dorm room drug dealers’
studied by Mohamed and Fritsvold (2010), who were rarely caught
or prosecuted. These campus drug dealers, however, were
relatively unconcerned about risk, keeping packages in plain sight
and having drugs mailed to them on campus, in contrast to the
highly security-conscious discourse we identiﬁed on Silk Road. But
the availability of shared ‘illicit capital’ is no guarantee that
vendors and buyers will adhere to these ‘good practice’ standards,
as illustrated by the limited use of encrypted communications we
found, alongside complaints about inadequate ‘stealth’ packaging.
Alternatively, cryptomarket drug trading may be riskier than
ofﬂine drug dealing if heavier penalties are handed down in the
event that a vendor’s real identity is connected to marketplace
aliases, making entire transaction histories available as evidence in
building cases for prosecution. It seems unlikely that the same
level of detailed and historical evidence would be available to law
enforcement constructing cases against drug dealers apprehended
in ofﬂine markets.
At least one policy-relevant reason for the importance of
research aimed at establishing varying risk across drug market
types is connected to effects on the price of drugs. The risks taken
by drug sellers – of which arrest is but one – are thought to increase
the price of illegal drugs (Reuter & Kleiman, 1986), with sellers
effectively compensated for accepting risk by setting higher prices.
If cryptomarkets reduce these risks, drug prices in turn may fall.
Only research with appropriately matched samples can establish
the relative risk of apprehension and arrest across different drug
market locations and conﬁgurations.
Continuing drug market innovation
We have already seen evidence that post-Onymous vendors
may be evolving their strategies for minimizing the risks of illegal
drug sales in the virtual and hidden location of cryptomarket, for
example with increased use of encrypted communications (Soska
& Christin, 2015), thereby reducing opportunities for law enforce-
ment to link illegal activities to identities. Our data were collected
before law enforcement turned the anonymity features of drug
cryptomarkets to their advantage, likely creating paranoia and
mistrust among participants (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016a).
However, law enforcement operations appear only to have
displaced vendors to alternative markets (Soska & Christin,
2015), with recent research showing sustained growth in thesemarkets up to January 2016 (Kruithof et al., 2016). Further research
is required to understand how risks are negotiated as these
marketplaces continue to evolve and innovate, with results
reported here providing a useful baseline for comparison.
Reliance on legitimate postal delivery services has been
described as a vulnerability for the cryptomarket trade in illegal
drugs (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016a). Our analyses have located
the sometimes-lengthy journey of shipments from vendor to
customer, stretched across time and location, as a source of some of
the unique risks inherent to cryptomarket trading. One possible
future development is delivery via ‘dead drops’ (Reddit, 2015) that
may go some way to addressing this vulnerability.
The dead drop delivery model involves a ‘dropman’ hiding a
consignment of pre-packaged and labelled drug deals, pur-
chased from a vendor offering the service, in a number of
suitably discreet ofﬂine locations, and then making available the
geo-coordinates alongside a short video for each ‘dropped’ deal.
Only once deals have been dropped are listings with this
delivery option offered to buyers. Customers making a purchase
in this way can immediately access the location information and
pick up the deal, with funds released to the vendor – and
commission to the dropman – from escrow once pick-up is
conﬁrmed. At least one cryptomarket currently allows vendors
this delivery option, but it is unknown how widespread take-up
is at present. The risk that a dropman may be undercover law
enforcement is possible, but a marketplace offering this delivery
option contends that the risk is small; undercover police posing
as dropmen can only arrest their own buyers, so necessitating
them committing more serious crimes (drug supply) to effect
arrests in connection only to less serious crimes. Dead drops
represent a further way in which drug markets generally – and
drug cryptomarkets speciﬁcally – innovate in response to the
risks posed by law enforcement. Researchers must track
innovative developments like these in the evolution of drug
cryptomarkets.
Concluding thoughts
Cryptomarket drug trading provides law enforcement with
unprecedented drug market intelligence. The data derived from
the ‘digital traces’ of advertising and sales on cryptomarkets
capture near-complete populations when compared to the
typically small and unrepresentative samples available in
connection to ofﬂine drug markets (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016;
Martin, 2014; Tzanetakis et al., 2015). But just as illegal drug
trading on cryptomarkets occurs in plain sight of law enforce-
ment, so too does the sharing among cryptomarket users of
strategies for reducing their risk of detection and arrest. This
abundance of intelligence available to actors operating on both
sides of the law may function to speed up innovation on the part
of those involved in illegal drug supply, on the one hand; and
necessitate – indeed facilitate – the development of law
enforcement strategies in response, on the other. Within a
context of continued global prohibition, the skills and expertise
required of national and international law enforcement agencies
to combat these drug market innovations will inevitably expand
in response, as will the associated resources for doing so. Will
cryptomarket users in post-Onymous cryptomarkets continue to
share risk reduction strategies in light of the certainty they must
now have that law enforcement really is watching and learning
from their public discussions? Or will they become more
circumspect, simultaneously undermining the cooperative pay-
off of crowd-sourced wisdom, in this sense re-constraining the
expanded rationality made possible in the cryptomarket com-
munity? Policy-makers, researchers, and law enforcement will
need to observe developments carefully.
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